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PROPERTY-DOWER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE Is ALLOWED. Box v.
Dudeck, 265 Ark. 165, 578 S.W.2d 567 (1979).
John E. Box, Jr., executed a written contract to sell eighty-
nine acres of land to R. F. Dudeck. Subsequently, Ruth M. Box,
John's wife, refused to join in the agreement or execute a deed re-
leasing her statutory dower rights. The buyer, Dudeck, then filed
suit in Washington County Chancery Court for specific perform-
ance of the land sales contract.
The chancellor found that Box had agreed to sell his interest
in the land and ordered specific performance of the land sales con-
tract. Dudeck was ordered to pay the agreed price, less the value of
the inchoate dower, which was found to be $20,826.00. The court
also ordered a lien imposed on the property subject to these condi-
tions: (a) if Box predeceased his wife, the lien would be void and
Mrs. Box's dower interest would attach; (b) if Box should be alive
seven years after the recordation of the deed, the abated amount
would be payable to Box; (c) if Mrs. Box relinquished her inchoate
dower right within seven years, the amount abated would be paya-
ble to her. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court
judgment with the modification that if Ruth Box predeceased her
husband within the seven year period, then the amount abated to
Dudeck should be paid to John Box. Box v. Dudeck, 265 Ark. 165,
578 S.W.2d 567 (1979).
It is not unusual for husbands to undertake to convey and give
good title to land owned by them, assuming the later responsibility
of securing the consent of their wives.' If the wife refuses to relin-
quish her inchoate dower rights,' the husband becomes liable for
1. Horack, Specific Performance and Dower Rights, 11 IOWA L. Rav. 97, 105 (1926).
2. At common law women were granted rights in their husband's property. These
rights were called dower, and were the product of a society desiring to provide a form of
social security to surviving widows. 2 R. POWmL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 209[1] (rev.
ad. 1977); 2 W. BLACKsTosz, ComuzTrrARS *130. Dower in Arkansas is statutory and ex-
tends both to the personal and real proprty of the husband. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-201
to -204, -206 (1971). With respect to land, a widow acquires one-third of her husband's
property for life. Id. § 61-201. However, if the husband dies leaving no children, the widow
obtains one-half in fee simple absolute. Id. § 61-206. The wife's entitlement to enjoy one of
these statutory estates is contingent upon her surviving her husband. Mickle v. Mickle, 253
Ark. 663, 488 S.W.2d 45 (1972). She nonetheless has rights which attach to his property
during his lifetime. These rights were designated as inchoate dower at common law. 2 R.
Powsm., supra. Arkansas's statutory inchoate dower prescribes that no act by the husband
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breach of contract because he cannot convey marketable title to
the property.3
American courts have allowed the purchaser to elect the rem-
edy of specific performance4 in lieu of an action for damages.'
Three general' approaches to applying the remedy have emerged.
Under the first approach, courts of equity allow a deduction from
the purchase price to the extent of the value of inchoate dower. A
second approach is to require the vendee to pay the full purchase
price and risk the possibility of dower vesting.' A third way is for
may deprive his wife of her dower rights in his property. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-208 (1971).
Moreover, the wife's right of dower is not cut off even though the husband may sell the land.
Id. § 61-207. The right may only be relinquished voluntarily and in a manner prescribed by
law. Id. § 50-418.
3. A land sales contract implies, in and of itself, ownership and the power to give
marketable title. Mays v. Blair, 120 Ark. 69, 179 S.W. 331 (1915). Title clouded by inchoate
dower is not marketable title. Vaughan v. Butterfield, 85 Ark. 289, 107 S.W. 993 (1908).
4. If one promises to sell a thing and fails to perform his promise, an action for dam-
ages by the aggrieved party is the sole redress in a law court, but a court of equity may
require the contract agreement to be specifically performed if an action at law for damages
is not considered an adequate remedy. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§§ 714, 717 (7th ed. 1857). Traditionally, a person making a contract for the sale of land can
be required to specifically perform on the theory that land, unlike personalty, has a special
value to the purchaser. Id. § 717. In an old case the Ohio court stated that "[the specific
performance of a contract rests on the ground that the ordinary remedy for its breach will
not afford adequate relief. In some cases, this is so apparent that a specific performance is
decreed as a matter of course. Such is the case of a contract for the conveyance of real
estate." Port Clinton R.R. v. Cleveland & T.R.R., 13 Ohio St. 544, 549 (1862).
5. 4A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1918
(repl. 1979).
6. Few jurisdictions follow any of these approaches precisely. The Missouri court char-
acterized these specific performance cases by stating that "[t]here is no unanimity of deci-
sion on this question of diminution of purchase price. The cases are in much confusion and
irreconcilable contrariety." Tebeau v. Ridge, 261 Mo. 547, 568, 170 S.W. 871, 876 (1914). See
Horack, supra note 1.
7. E.g., Brookings v. Cooper, 256 Mass. 121, 152 N.E. 243 (1926). This approach re-
flects a general rule of equity jurisprudence; the vendee should only pay for that perform-
ance which the vendor could give, it being unjust to allow the vendor to profit by his own
default. 2 J. STORY, supra note 4, at § 779.
8. E.g., Riesz's Appeal, 73 Pa. 485 (1873). The Pennslyvania court refused to reduce
the purchase price to the extent the vendor did not perform the land sales contract. The
court reasoned that "[tlhe wife is not to be wrought upon by her love for her husband, and
sympathy in his situation, to do that which her judgment disapproves as contrary to her
interest; nor is he to be tempted to use undue means to procure her consent." Id. at 490.
The Missouri court followed the above reasoning and stated that a court of equity should
not indirectly or even remotely coerce a woman to relinquish her inchoate dower in the face
of a statute which expressly provides that any relinquishment of her rights is to be done
voluntarily. Aiple-Hemmelmann Real Estate Co. v. Spelbrink, 211 Mo. 671, 706, 111 S.W.
480, 489 (1908). The court also stated that the amount to be deducted from the purchase
price is not ascertainable because the value of the inchoate dower right cannot be calculated
NOTES
the court to allow the value of inchoate dower to be deducted from
the purchase price and to be held by the vendee until the dower
rights expire or become barred."
In Hirschman v. Forehand,0 the Arkansas Supreme Court
elected to follow the first approach. This requires the vendee to
pay only for that performance the vendor can give. Later, in
Sebold v. Williamson,"1 the court shifted its position and held that
the amount abated should be regarded as an indemnity, thereby
applying the third general approach. Under this approach the eq-
uitable remedy may be divided into three elements: the amount to
be abated from the purchase price, the handling of the indemnity,
and the interest, if any, which should be paid by the vendee on
the amount abated.
If the vendor's wife refuses to relinquish her inchoate dower,
the vendor cannot convey all of the property interest which he
promised to sell. Thus, the amount to be abated from the purchase
price is the value of the inchoate dower right since the vendee
should not have to pay for a performance which the vendor cannot
render.12 In Sebold the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
amount to be abated is one-third of the total purchase price agreed
to by the parties. The court settled on this figure because the ac-
tual value of inchoate dower could not be ascertained with reason-
able precision.13
The indemnity element of the remedy allows the vendor to re-
ceive the amount retained by the vendee if dower never vests; but
if dower vests, then the amount of the purchase price retained by
the vendee compensates him for the loss of land to which the
with reasonable precision. Id. at 711, 111 S.W. at 491. See also Kuratli v. Jackson, 60 Or.
203, 118 P. 192 (1911) (to grant specific performance is to make a new contract for the
parties).
9. The apparent reason for this approach is that the vendee should retain the amount
deducted from the purchase price only if the dower interest vests. See Holly Hill Lumber
Co. v. McCoy, 203 S.C. 59, 26 S.E.2d 175 (1943). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 365,
Illustration 4 (1932).
10. 114 Ark. 436, 170 S.W. 98 (1914). See also Osborne v. Fairley, 138 Ark. 433, 211
S.W. 917 (1919); Reed v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 58, 83 S.W.2d 554 (1935). The Arkansas court
first alluded to the problem in Vaughan v. Butterfield, 85 Ark. 289, 107 S.W. 993 (1908).
11. 203 Ark. 741, 158 S.W.2d 667 (1942). This rule was subsequently followed in Haw-
kins v. Lamb, 210 Ark. 1, 194 S.W.2d 5 (1946).
12. Vaughan v. Butterfield, 85 Ark. 289, 292, 107 S.W. 993, 993 (1908).
13. 203 Ark. 741, 745, 158 S.W.2d 667, 668 (1942). Apparently the court settled on this
figure because ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-201 (1971) (the general dower statute) grants one-third
of the land to the wife for life.
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dower interest attaches." In Sebold the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed a chancery court judgment which held that the amount
abated and retained by the vendee would become payable to the
vendor if he survived his wife or if the wife should release her
dower.15 The court also affirmed the chancery court decree that a
lien should be retained in the deed by the vendor to protect his
conditional right of payment." In Fletcher v. Felker,17 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas followed
this indemnity procedure, but also held that the expiration of the
dower statute of limitations1 8 would bar inchoate dower from vest-
ing, and if dower became barred before vesting the amount abated
should be payable to the vendor.1'
The Arkansas Supreme Court has not passed upon the ques-
tion of whether interest should be paid on the amount abated. In
Fletcher the federal court, interpreting Arkansas law, held that the
.vendee should retain the amount abated without interest.20
In Box v. Dudeck,"' the principal case, there were four argu-
ments advanced by Mr. Box. First, the contract to sell was condi-
tioned upon Ruth Box joining in- the conveyance. 2 As to this con-
tention, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the finding of the
trial judge that John Box unconditionally agreed to sell his interest
in the property, reasoning that the chancellor was in a position to
observe the witnesses and should be overturned only if the finding
was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.' 8 The sec-
ond argument advanced was that the value of the inchoate dower
for abatement purposes, as set by the chancellor, was in error."
The court upheld the value set by the chancellor, stating that al-
though it may not have been precise, the burden was on the chal-
14. See note 9 supra.
15. 203 Ark. 741, 743, 158 S.W.2d 667, 668 (1942).
16. Id.
17. 97 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
18. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-226 (1971).
19. The federal court stated that "the only reasonable interpretation of the [statutory]
language used is that her dower right is barred after the lapse of seven years, regardless of
any effort on her part to assert it before that time." Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F. Supp. 755, 763
(W.D. Ark. 1951).
20. Id. at 764.
21. 265 Ark. 165, 578 S.W.2d 567 (1979).
22. Id. at 166, 578 S.W.2d at 568.
23. Id. at 168, 578 S.W.2d at 569.
24. Id. at 169, 578 S.W.2d at 570.
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NOTES
lenging party to show affirmatively that the value was erroneous. a
The third argument presented was that the amount abated was a
judgment and should bear interest as provided by law.2 6 The court
found that the reduction in the purchase price was not a judgment
because the dower interest had not been destroyed by granting
specific performance to the vendee and thus no interest should be
charged. 1 The court stated that the amount abated could be payed
to Mrs. Box whenever she relinquished her inchoate dower.28 Fi-
nally, it was argued that the trial judge erred by not holding that if
Ruth Box predeceased John Box within the seven year period the
amount abated should be payable to him.29 The court held this to
be an oversight by the chancellor and accordingly modified the
decree. 0
There are several inherent problems with granting specific
performance in situations such as the one presented in Box. The
method employed by Arkansas for ascertaining the value of incho-
ate dower for abatements' purposes is deficient in several respects.
Under prior law the value of inchoate dower was set at one-third of
the contract price.3 2 The basic weakness of this method of valua-
tion lies in the fact that it does not consider the possibility that
dower may not vest. It is clear that the value of the inchoate dower
of a wife who is fifty years old, with a husband who is thirty-five
years old, is worth less than the inchoate dower of a wife who is
thirty-five and married to a man who is fifty.33 Moreover, the wife's
dower, in realty, is only one-third for life3' rather than one-third





29. Id. at 170, 578 S.W.2d at 570.
30. Id.
31. Abatement is a term of art, with different meanings depending upon the context in
which it is being used. See BALLaNrNE's LAW Dic oNAaY 2 (3d ed. 1969). For purposes of
this note it shall mean the diminution of the purchase price of the land sales contract to the
extent of the value of the inchoate dower right.
32. Sebold v. Williamson, 203 Ark. 741, 743, 158 S.W.2d 667, 668 (1942).
33. A Rhode Island court saw the error of setting the value of inchoate dower at one-
third of the purchase price. The court held that the value should be determined with the aid
of mortality and present value tables. Najarian v. Boyajian, 48 R.I. 213, 219, 136 A. 767, 770
(1927).
34. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-201 (1971).
35. The Indiana court recognized this fault of using one-third of the purchase price.
Martin v. Merritt, 57 Ind. 34, 41 (1877).
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dower would be one-half in fee simple absolute. 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Box, without providing a rea-
son, deferred to the chancellor's wisdom in calculating the value of
the inchoate dower right.3 7 It is open to question whether this pol-
icy is appropriate with respect to determining the value of the in-
choate dower. In Box the chancellor arrived at the value by using
an outdated and no longer accurate statutory table8 designed for
calculating the present value of vested life and remainder interests
in property.39 One error of this is obvious aside from the unreliabil-
ity of the table. Inchoate dower is not a life estate, but is only a
possibility of a life estate40 or an estate in fee if there are no
children.4
1
Some jurisdictions use an actuarial method of calculation
which considers the effect of the contingent nature of dower on the
value of the inchoate right . Results obtained by this method re-
36. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-206 (1971).
37. 265 Ark. 165, 169, 578 S.W.2d 567, 570 (1979).
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-705 (1971). This table is actuarily unsound, being out of date
by thirty to forty years.
39. 265 Ark. 165, 169, 578 S.W.2d 567, 570 (1979). The following is an attempt to
reconstruct the calculations made by the chancellor. Since the wife was 48 years old, the
"proper" annuity figure was 11.5700 according to the table in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-705
(1971). The foregoing annuity figure times an income stream from one-third of the property
(calculated by taking 6% of $30,000.00, which is one-third of the purchase price agreed to
by Box and Dudeck) equals $20,826.00, which is the value of the inchoate dower right as
found by the chancellor in Box.
40. The inchoate dower right of a wife is contingent upon the husband predeceasing
her. Mickle v. Mickle, 253 Ark. 663, 488 S.W.2d 45 (1972).
41. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-206 (1971).
42. In Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige Ch. 386 (N.Y. 1839), the New York court expressed
the following formula:
[A]scertain the present value of an annuity for her life equal to the interest in the
third of the proceeds of the estate to which her contingent right of dower attaches,
and then . . . deduct from the present value of the annuity for her life, the value
of a similar annuity depending upon the joint lives of herself and her husband;
and the difference between those two sums will be the present value of her contin-
gent right of dower.
Id. at 408.
Tables based upon the above formula were published. E.F.P., On The Present Value of
Dower Rights- Vested and Contingent, 4 Q.L.J. 1 (1859). Even though these tables are long
out of date, new tables may be established by the use of the proper actuarial methods as set
out therein.
The Virginia court followed the above formula and denounced a similar formula which
deducted the expectation of the life of the husband from the similar expectation of the wife.
Under this formula the inchoate dower right could be worthless or even have a negative
value if the husband was substantially younger than the wife. The court thought this possi-
ble result to be repugnant to the idea of dower being a valuable right. Strayer v. Long, 86
NOTES
flect only the average probabilities of whether dower will vest.' 3
The circumstances and particulars of a given case may vary, of
course, in that the husband or the wife may have characteristics or
habits which alter their life expectancies from the norm. This
presents the question of whether the use of this method is alto-
gether proper since inequities may occur in a particular situation."
Another weakness of the actuarial method, with all of its elaborate
calculations and considerations, is that it does not take into con-
sideration the effect of changing land prices on the value of incho-
ate dower." However, it cannot be denied that the value of incho-
ate dower is more closely approximated by the actuarial method
than by the former Arkansas rule"4 which rather arbitrarily set the
value of inchoate dower at one-third of the purchase price. The
actuarial method of valuation may also be superior to the Box rule
since it at least establishes guidelines for the chancellor to follow
in ascertaining the value of inchoate dower.
As noted above, several jurisdictions have adopted the actua-
rial approach as being sufficiently accurate for purposes of granting
specific performance in cases such as Box. However, this might not
be a proper course for Arkansas because the formula4 7 does not
take into consideration complicating factors peculiar to Arkansas.
One of these factors is that the chances of dower vesting are de-
creased by the statute of limitations4' and thus the value of incho-
ate dower correspondingly decreases because its value lies in the
possibility of its eventual vesting. The value of inchoate dower is
also directly affected by the Arkansas statute4 9 which declares that
the wife will receive one-half in fee if her husband dies without
children. 60 The value of a possibility to receive one-half in fee is
Va. 557, 10 S.E. 574 (1890). See also Share v. Trickle, 183 Wis. 1, 197 N.W. 329 (1924).
43. The calculations are based upon mortality tables. See generally E.F.P., supra note
42. Mortality tables reflect the average probabilities of continued life based upon the actual
human experience of life and death. See Brown v. Bronson, 35 Mich. 415, 421 (1877).
44. See Sternberger v. McGovern, 56 N.Y. 12, 20 (1874). Contra, Brown v. Bronson, 5
Mich. 415, 421 (1877) (defending the use of mortality tables).
45. It seems to be elementary that if the value of the land increases, then the value of
the inchoate dower attaching thereto would also increase.
46. E.g., Hirschman v. Forehand, 114 Ark. 436, 170 S.W. 98 (1914).
47. See note 42 supra.
48. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-226 (1971).
49. Id. § 61-206.
50. Alabama, having a similar statute, sets the value of the inchoate dower according
to which estate the wife presently appears able to take. Sadler v. Radcliff, 215 Ala. 499, 504,
111 So. 231, 235 (1927). However, this overlooks the possibility that the circumstances may
1980]
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clearly worth more than a possibility to receive one-third for life. It
thereby becomes evident that the true value of inchoate dower can
only be approximated and is not precisely calculable."1 It may be
likened to the air we breathe. There is no doubt about its presence,
but its very nature defies man's perception.
Since the present Arkansas rule requires some amount to be
chosen to represent the value of inchoate dower,
52 it is important
to note the serious ramifications that may arise from an erroneous
valuation. If the value is set too high, the vendee obtains an un-
warranted gain and the vendor an unjust loss. 5 3 In this instance the
wife might initially suffer if she is dependent for support on the
vendor-husband. The wife might be coerced in this situation to re-
linquish her statutory" right. Moreover, the legislature has de-
creed that any relinquishment of dower is to be by the wife's own
voluntary act.5 5 Potential injustice, however, is not limited to the
vendor and his wife. If the value set is lower than the true value of
inchoate dower, the vendee would suffer.
A second inherent problem with the Arkansas approach in-
volves the handling of the indemnity portion of the equitable rem-
edy. In Arkansas the amount abated is payable to the vendor if the
inchoate right does not vest, but if it does vest, the amount abated
is retained by the vendee.56 This might not be equitable in Arkan-
sas. If there are children in being when the dower vests, then the
vendee merely loses the use of a life estate and does not lose a part
of the land absolutely.5 7 The vendee might secure the entire title
for less than the true value with a limited inconvenience imposed
change. Minge v. Green, 176 Ala. 343, 356, 58 So. 381, 385 (1912) (dissenting opinion).
51. Several jurisdictions take this view. E.g., Aiple-Hemmelmann Real Estate Co. v.
Spelbrink, 211 Mo. 671, 111 S.W. 480 (1908).
52. Box v. Dudeck, 265 Ark. 165, 578 S.W.2d 567 (1979).
53. It would seem that the vendor should receive the full value of the part perform-
ance he renders. Moreover, the vendee should not be entitled to something he has not paid
for.
54. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-201 (1971).
55. Id. § 50-418. This is very similar to the Iowa holdings to which the Arkansas court
has referred many times. See Vaughan v. Butterfield, 85 Ark. 289, 107 S.W. 993 (1908);
Hirschman v. Forehand, 114 Ark. 436, 170 S.W. 98 (1914); Sebold v. Williamson, 203 Ark.
741, 158 S.W.2d 667 (1942). The Iowa position is easily understood when notice is taken of
the fact that IowA CODE ANN. §§ 633.211, .238 (1964) grants a portion of the husband's lands
in fee. In view of this, the absolute retention by the vendee of the amount abated if dower
vests appears equitable because the vendee absolutely loses part of the land for which he
has bargained.
56. Box v. Dudeck, 265 Ark. 165, 578 S.W.2d 567 (1979).
57. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-201, -206 (1971).
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by the dower for as long as the widow lives. Other jurisdictions
with dower statutes which grant life estates instead of estates in
fee require the amount abated to be paid to the vendor's heirs at
the expiration of the dower."
It is also doubtful whether the apparent interpretation of the
dower statute of limitations" by the Arkansas court in Box is
wholly correct. Under Box the inchoate right is barred by the
dower statute of limitations regardless of any action on the part of
the wife to preserve it." The concept of dower came about as a
device to protect and provide for the wife.61 If the husband can
dispose of property to a willing buyer without the wife's agree-
ment, subject only to a seven year statute of limitations, then the
intention of society with regard to dower and the economic impor-
tance of it in providing for widows is substantially undermined.
Although the Arkansas statute of limitations is useful in clearing
land titles, it is difficult to believe that the General Assembly in-
tended it to be used as a device which would partially vitiate its
attempt to provide for widows. In this regard the legislature has
decreed that no act of the husband shall infringe upon the wife's
right to dower," even though he may sell the land." Indeed, an-
other element of coercion on the widow's share arises.
Another obvious problem of the Arkansas approach is the dis-
allowance of interest on the amount abated during the time that
dower remains inchoate." This rule allows the vendee to have the
use of the amount abated plus the use of the land to which dower
attaches as long as the right remains inchoate. The vendee thereby
receives an unwarranted gain and a corresponding hardship is
placed upon the vendor and his wife. An undesirable coercion on
the wife to release her dower again becomes evident, disregarding
the legislative requirement that relinquishment of dower is to be
58. E.g., Sadler v. Radcliff, 215 Ala. 499, 504, 111 So. 231, 235 (1927).
59. Am. STAT. ANN. § 61-226 (1971).
60. 265 Ark. 165, 170, 578 S.W.2d 567, 570 (1979). See also Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F.
Supp. 755, 763 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
61. 2 R. Powsau, supra note 1.
62. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-208 (1971).
63. Id. § 61-207.
64. In Box v. Dudeck, 265 Ark. 165, 169, 578 S.W.2d 567, 570 (1979) the Arkansas
court did not face the interest question as part of the equity remedy. It was contended by
the appellant that the amount abated was a judgment which is required by law to bear
interest The court simply stated that it was not a judgment. However, a federal court, in-
terpreting Arkansas law, decreed that the vendee was to hold the amount abated without
interest. Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F. Supp. 755, 764 (1951).
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voluntary. 5 Some other jurisdictions recognize this gross inequity
and require interest to be paid."
Further, the court in Box stated that the wife may receive the
amount abated if she should subsequently release her dower rights
to the vendee.6 7 This is altogether inconsistent with the idea of in-
choate dower due to the fact that dower is only a contingent
right.6 8 To allow the abated amount to be paid to the wife upon
relinquishment of inchoate dower is to give her something that the
dower statute" does not. Moreover, she is not without rights in the
amount abated, if it were returned to her husband upon the relin-
quishment of her right.
70
The Box decision indicates the willingness of the Arkansas
court to continue its practice of apportioning the rights of the par-
ties in cases fraught with impossible difficulties and uncertainties.
It is elementary that the function of equity is to do what is equita-
ble and not to add to injustice. Some jurisdictions recognize the
inability of a court to reach a truly equitable result in cases such as
Box and only allow the remedy of specific performance if the ven-
dee is willing to pay the full purchase price and risk the possibility
of dower vesting.71 Under this line of thought a recalcitrant spouse
could prevent her husband from selling his interest in land because
prospective buyers usually would not accept land subject to incho-
ate dower. This result would be repugnant to the policy of Arkan-
sas law which allows the husband to sell his interest in property
even though his wife refuses to join.
72
In any event, the Arkansas Supreme Court should not be dele-
gated the task of dealing with the insolvable problems which arise
when the wife refuses to join the husband's conveyances. A court
should not have to be associated with the improprieties which may
65. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-418 (1971).
66. E.g., Sadler v. Radcliff, 215 Ala. 499, 504, 111 So. 231, 235 (1927). Contra, Peddi-
cord v. Peddicord, 242 Iowa 555, 47 N.W.2d 264 (1951) (enunciating the Iowa rule).
67. 265 Ark. at 169, 578 S.W.2d at 567.
68. LeCroy v. Cook, 211 Ark. 966, 204 S.W.2d 173 (1947).
69. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-201 (1971).
70. See id. § 61-202.
71. See generally cases cited note 8 supra.
72. This conclusion is supported by a reading of the Arkansas statutes. The General
Assembly felt so strongly about the preservation of the homestead right that it decreed that
any contract which purported to convey away homestead is invalid. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-
415 (1971). However, the inchoate dower right statutes do not invalidate a contract which
affects land to which dower might attach. They only declare that such a contract will not
deny the wife her dower estate unless she assents thereto. Id. §§ 61-207, -208 (1971).
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occur in cases such as Box. Some relief may be in sight since,
under the rationale of a recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sion,7 3 there is a distinct possibility that the inchoate right may be
in violation of the United States Constitution. Be that as it may,
inchoate dower was created by the General Assembly, and it is
within its power to take it away.7' If the legislature decides that
the policy pertaining to inchoate dower should be preserved, then
it has an inherent responsibility to formulate guidelines for solving
the difficult problems which arise in cases such as Box.7
Charles Clifford Gibson III
73. While the wife has an inchoate dower right, the husband does not have an incho-
ate curtesy right. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-229 (1971). A similar type of unequal treatment
based upon gender was held to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment. See Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) where the Supreme Court stated that "[n]eedy males could be
helped along with needy females with little if any additional burden on the State."
74. Dower is not a constitutionally protected right. Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23
Wall.) 137 (1874); State v. Boney, 156 Ark. 169, 245 S.W. 315 (1922).
75. A salutory step was taken by the West Virginia legislature in providing the proce-
dure and guidelines for situations where the husband wishes to convey his interest in land
and the wife does not wish to release her dower interest. WEST Vmc. CODE ANN. § 43-2-4
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
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